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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to highlight some of the key issues surrounding the development and application of immigration 
law as it applies in the United Kingdom (UK) to refugees attempting to be reunited with their families living 
abroad. The right for refugees to be reunited with their families is enshrined in international law, but this is 
frequently frustrated by the legal and administrative systems used in the UK. Using content analysis and doctrinal 
analysis techniques, the paper provides an examination of how a philosophy which considers the emotional effects 
of the law, therapeutic jurisprudence, could be used not only to inform interpretation of current domestic laws, 
but also influence the drafting of future legislation. This is an aspect of current refugee law in the United Kingdom 
which has yet to be examined. It provides, we argue, a humanitarian direction to statutory interpretation which 
may provide tangible benefits to current and proposed legal systems.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‘Refugees run multiple risks in the process of fleeing from persecution, one of which is the very real risk of 
separation from their families.’ (Jastram and Newland (2003) at p. 555).  
  
Legislation, both international and domestic, regulate the mechanism for refugees to be reunited with their 
families. Whilst recognised as a human right and a fundamental requirement in several international treaties and 
conventions, it is subject to numerous limitations and exemptions in domestic law. A tension exists between the 
rights of individuals to be able to be joined with their family to start their new life in a ‘safe’ country, with State 
desires to regulate immigration and protect against abuse of the system. A potential resolution to some of the most 
contentious differences is being considered by the UK Parliament. However, as immigration legislation has 
become a battleground for political disagreements, and faced with legislative inertia surrounding the British exit 
of the European Union, this may be unfulfilled. 
 
This paper is concerned with the rights of individuals who reside in the UK as a refugee.1 Having been designated 
a refugee, the individual is unable to reside in their home country due to fear of persecution or a lack of safety due 
to conflict. Such individuals have a right, enshrined in international and national law, to be reunited with their 
(nuclear and pre-flight) families living abroad.2 This right is exercised through an application procedure and one 
which, at least according to the government,3 is straightforward and sufficiently accessible as to not require free 
legal assistance. The reality, however, as substantiated through several reports demonstrates a system fraught with 
difficulties and practical obstacles which can prevent the reunification of the refugee with their disunited spouse 
and children.4 Beyond the practical problems including language and cultural barriers (Pereira, 2012), limited IT 
skills and obstacles around Western constructs of, for example, celebrating and registering births and the 
collection, collation and maintenance of supporting documents, refugees have already experienced significant 
disruption to their lives. They have been separated from their families, they frequently display signs of distress 
and mistrust of organisations and personnel in authoritative positions, and recent research has identified that all 
refugees suffer some element of post-traumatic stress (Goodman et al., 2017). Such trauma is found from the 
above circumstances but also poverty (Fortuny, Hernandez, and Chaudry, 2010), problems accessing services 
(Yoshikawa, Godfrey, and Rivera, 2008), the circumstances surrounding the processing of immigration claims 
                                                 
1 An individual may arrive in the UK with refugee status through the Gateway or Protection programmes. 
Typically, the individual arrives in the UK, claims asylum and may or may not be granted refugee status or 
humanitarian protection for five years. This may be granted on the basis of first tier decision making or granted 
post a tribunal hearing. 
2 In country applications are also possible where the family members already reside in the UK, although these 
applications are subject to different applications (and is a paid route, rather than free as per refugee family 
reunion). 
3 Hansard, 29 November 2016, Vol. 617, Column 539WH. Available: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-11-
29/debates/16112935000003/RefugeeFamilyReunion(ImmigrationRules) (accessed 1 July 2019). 
4 See for instance UNICEF (2016) Available: https://downloads.unicef.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Unicef_TheRefugeOfFamily_briefing.pdf (accessed 1 July 2019); Beswick (2015); and 
Connell et al. (2010).  
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(Letiecq et al., 2014), and the uncertainty surrounding the refugees’ future treatment (Schumm et al., 2005). These 
issues create practical problems which, understandably, have significant psychological and anti-therapeutic 
effects on the parties concerned. They are also subject to legal systems which exist to facilitate remedies for 
breaches of substance and procedure. 
 
Resolving problems which have a justiciable solution has been the subject of profound change and evolution in 
recent years. If one is to consider the work of Lord Woolf and the reforms suggested following the Access to 
Justice report (Lord Woolf, 1996), it is evident that embedding comprehensive law approaches into legal systems 
has resulted in a changing philosophy (Donoghue, 2014) to be applied in these jurisdictions.5 This has been 
observed in many discrete legal disciplines including criminal law, family law, employment and immigration (to 
name but a few). For instance, creative problem-solving and specific problem-solving courts, holistic justice, 
preventive law and restorative justice are but some examples of movements in this area. These approaches 
expound issues of social justice and human rights to be values within justice systems and processes and further, 
should form a central component of such. These humanitarian-based approaches are beginning to become more 
commonplace in the UK justice system. They are unique in their aims and scope, yet they do share commonalities.  
 
The academic literature on the subject of refugees and their movements around the world has led to the 
introduction and critique of many theoretical models. Among those relevant for the purpose of this paper include 
Castles (2011), using migration theory to explain how economic and sociological theories can be used to 
understand migration flows. Previous work, undertaken by organisations such as the Scottish Refugee Council 
(2010), report on the current state of refugee family reunion, adopting a grounded theory approach. Internationally, 
Boswell (2002) addresses a number of theoretical models and positions to explain migration. For example, macro 
theory is useful for discussing forced displacement of migrants; micro theory is used in terms of rational choice 
theory, and meso theory, which examines the systems and networks involved in refugee migration (see Faist, 
2000), provides a discourse surrounding the causes of refugee movements. However, these theories did not 
address the use of law and/or the role that law and actors within the system play on those exposed to it. The authors 
were interested in a lens, of which we had become aware through the seminal works of Wexler and Winick 
(Wexler and Winick, 1991; 1996; and 2006) and Perlin,6 through which the emotional effects of the law could be 
viewed and assessed. Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) appeared to us to be the most appropriate model and an 
antidote to the negative effects that refugees experience, not only on the travel to the UK, but more significantly 
to their treatment within its legal and administrative system.7 This includes the negative psychological effects 
experienced by refugees separated from their families, and the need for their well-being as a central component 
of their interaction with the legal and non-legal processes. 
 
2. Refugee Family Reunion: The Current State of the Law 
 
The law relating to refugee family reunion consists of both international obligations, conventions, EU legislation 
and national laws. Collectively they operate to provide a framework for the protection of refugees and of their 
rights when residing in the host state. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees8 
along with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees establish a framework for international refugee 
protection.9 Further, “[t]he object and purpose of the 1951 Convention implies that its rights are in principle 
                                                 
5 However, the results of the Access to Justice Report, in making the legal system less complex and more user-
friendly, have not been fulfilled. See Harris (2018) Available https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/law/there-is-no-
access-to-justice-if-the-public-cannot-understand-it-przdt50rn (accessed 1 July 2019). 
6 Perlin has written extensively on the topic but see “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and 
Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law” (1994); and Perlin, Gould and Dorfman (1995). 
7 Per Inter-Governmental Consultation on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America 
and Australia “Report on Family Reunification: Overview of Policies and Practices in IGC Participating States”, 
1997, p.17 “Even if in most [European] States family reunification is ruled by legislative instruments, 
administrative regulations are often used to complete legislation with practical aspects and can result in a tougher 
or more favourable implementation of the law.” 
8 Although the 1951 Convention is not without its critics – see Goodwin-Gill (2001) pp. 1-2: it is “… functionally 
inefficient, overly legalistic, complex, and difficult to apply within a world of competing [and changing] 
priorities…” 
9 The right to family reunion arises from the 1951 Refugee Convention and is only a right given to recognised 
refugees who have been granted refugee status or, since October 2006, five-years limited leave to remain under 
the Humanitarian Protection mechanism. The right to family reunion is written into Part 8 and the relatively new 
FM section (Family Dependants) of the Immigration Rules (not under the Part 11 Asylum section). 
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extended to the family members of refugees.”10 Whilst not specifically relating to family reunion, the principle of 
family unity is referred to in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook11 which 
identifies that as a minimum, the spouse and children (before reaching the age of majority) of the refugee should 
benefit from the provisions establishing family unity. This, specifically, relates to family life which has been 
disrupted due to the refugee’s persecution in the home State or due to conflict making further residence in the 
State unsafe. The European Convention on Human Rights also ensures the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
individuals in the Member States. Further, since 2006 the UK has been bound by the EU Refugee Qualification 
Directive 2004/83/EC12 which, at Article 23, provides for the protection of family unity and for reciprocal rights 
to be provided to qualifying family members in relation to State benefits.13 These provisions mirror those included 
in Part 11 of the Immigration Rules. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), at 
Article 3(1) obligates signatory States that “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Whilst a source of international law, and not incorporated into 
national law to the extent as is the ECHR, its relationship to ECHR Article 8 and the requirement for the 
teleological interpretation through existing legislative sources has been recognised.14 
 
Finally for this section briefly outlining the international regulations on refugee family reunion, the EU Dublin 
Regulation15 seeks to determine State responsibility for deciding asylum claims lodged in an EU Member State, 
in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland. The Regulation requires Member States to either maintain the 
close family members (spouse and children) or to bring them together when individuals seek asylum. Interestingly, 
and in relation to the proposed Bill16 relating to refugee family reunion, the Regulation covers unaccompanied 
minors and their rights to be brought together where this is in the best interests of the child. It further extends to 
other relatives beyond the child’s parents or siblings, where these extended family members may be in a position 
to care for the child. A stipulation, which perhaps limits the full effect of the Regulation, is that the extended 
family members must be legally present in the Member State. Asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their 
application are, for the purposes of the Regulation, considered legally present in the Member State. 
 
These international sources of law play an important role in enhancing the visibility and protection of refugees 
and their families. When national laws and legislation are read in light of these provisions, they can promote 
greater engagement with protective powers and facilitate a systematic interpretative approach. 
 
2.1 National Legislation 
 
The domestic rules and regulations governing refugee family reunion are extensive and subject to frequent change. 
Action by Parliament has resulted in the enactment of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 which established 
the provision for asylum support and the creation of the regulatory body (the Office of the Immigration Services 
Commissioner). The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides the definition of “serious criminal” 
(s. 72) which is used to withdraw the protection afforded to refugees.17 It also establishes the rights of appeal for 
refused refugee family reunion applications. The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 
explains how decision-makers should apply rules regarding issues affecting an applicant’s credibility, and the 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 deals with the State’s duties towards children. It introduced, at s. 
55, a new duty “… to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom.” The 
                                                 
10 UNHCR  (2001), para. 7. 
11 At chapter VI, paras 181-188. 
12 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted. This Directive provides an interpretation for how the term “refugee” should 
be defined and how a person who is not deemed a refugee may qualify for subsidiary protection. 
13 Articles 24 - 34. 
14 See LD (Article 8 best interests of child) Zimbabwe [2010] UKUT 278. Per para. 27 “Although questions exist 
about the status of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in domestic law, we take the view that there can 
be little reason to doubt that the interests of the child should be a primary consideration in immigration cases.” 
15 (EU) No. 604/2013 (sometimes referred to as the Dublin III Regulation). 
16 Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill [HL] 2017-19. 
17 Although this measure was subject to criticism by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. See House of Lords 
and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights “The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
(Specification of Particularly Serious Crimes) Order 2004” (2004) Twenty-second Report of Session 2003-04, 
HL Paper 190, HC 1212. 
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Immigration Act 2016 introduced new sanctions for illegal working and sought to enhance enforcement of 
immigration law and to prevent “illegal migrants” from accessing services. 
 
Beyond legislative sources, the Rules and Regulations applying to refugees exist in the Refugee or Person in Need 
of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, which transpose into national law aspects of the 
Refugee Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC. Also, in the Immigration Rules, Part 11: Asylum the procedures for 
determining asylum claims, the granting of leave to remain and rules relating to family reunion are contained 
(although provisions in Parts 8 and 9 may be relevant in certain circumstances). The main provisions relevant to 
refugee family reunion are as follows: 
 
 paras 319X - 319XB set out the requirements for leave to enter the UK or to remain as the child (and 
under the age of 18) of a relative who has refugee status or humanitarian protection.  
 paras 320 - 322 establish the grounds on which a refusal of family reunion may be made. 
 paras 339A - 339AC and 339BA establish when the status of “refugee” may be revoked or renewed. 
Similar rules are provided for in paras 339G - 339GD for individuals granted humanitarian protection 
 paras 352A - 352FJ18 identify the rules on which the granting of refugee family reunion is made. This, 
restrictively, is applied to the spouses and civil partners,19 unmarried / same sex partners,20 of the refugee 
and the children (biological, adopted and de facto adopted, under the age of 18) of the refugee21 who are 
“sponsored” by the refugee living in the UK.  
 
The outcome of the decisions made in relation to this Part of the Immigration Rules are subject to strict appeals 
procedures and the Immigration Act 2014 s. 15 reduced access in this regard. An appeal against a decision to 
refuse a human right, protection claim or a decision to revoke protected status are the grounds upon which such 
an appeal may be brought. The Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 s. 82(1)(b) covers refusal of human 
rights claims and is based on the grounds that the decision reached is unlawful in relation to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 s. 6. Importantly, a refusal of an application for leave to enter or to remain in the UK on the basis of the 
refugee family reunion rules is considered a human rights claim for the purposes of this section of the Act. 
 
3. Legislative Constraints and Judicial Canutism: Problems with the Law 
 
As outlined above, the system of refugee family reunion is based predominately on a series of international and 
domestic legislative provisions applied under the overriding humanitarian principles of human rights. Before 
embarking on a review of the problems with the domestic law and a somewhat restrictive interpretative regime 
adopted in the courts and immigration tribunals, it is useful to explain briefly how the individual refugee applies 
to be reunited with their family. The refugee residing in the UK is known as the sponsor and it is they who make 
the application for reunion on behalf of their family members residing outside of the UK (a system also exists for 
in-country family reunion). The submission of the application is cost free, although through the removal of legal 
aid and the significant reductions to accessible legal aid and advisory services, legal support is often effectively 
denied to refugees.22 The process is considered by the government to be straightforward. Thus, following 
commencement of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012,23 legal aid was removed (in 
England and Wales, it continues in Scotland) as the refugee applicants were considered able to complete the form 
and submit this along with supplementary evidence. The process has, however, been referred to as complicated,24 
the application form is subject to change without notification, and therefore the refugee often will require 
assistance (by a person who understands the system) to complete the form correctly. This last point is particularly 
                                                 
18 Paragraphs 352FA, 352 FD and 352 FG of the Immigration Rules provide parallel provisions of family reunion 
for individuals granted humanitarian protection (on or after 30 August 2005). Individuals with humanitarian 
protection status are considered as refugees by the UNHCR. 
19 Para. 352A of the Immigration Rules.  
20 Para. 352AA of the Immigration Rules.  
21 Para. 352D of the Immigration Rules.  
22 Refugee Action, an organisation which aids refugees and advocates on their behalf, published a report “Tipping 
the Scales: Access to Justice in the Asylum System” (2018) in which it found that 76% of the 92 organisations 
surveyed were finding it ‘very difficult’ or ‘quite difficult’ to refer people on to legal representatives; since 2005 
the proportion of not-for-profit legal and non-legal service providers had fallen by 64%, and 56% of legal aid 
providers had been lost in the sector. See https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Access-
to-Justice-July-18-1.pdf (accessed 1 July 2019). 
23 The commencement of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 on 1 April 2013 
removed the legal aid available for refugee family reunion claims in England and Wales.  
24 For discussions of the implications for refugee family reunion see Beswick (2015); and Staver (2008). 
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important. Collating the required documentation, understanding the nuances and variances of the language used 
within the application process, and to give the applicant and their sponsor “a voice” through their supporting 
statement, requires some form of assistance, navigation and support. On completion of the application, it is 
assessed and verified by a member of the UK civil service. This individual is called an Entry Clearance Officer 
(ECO) and it is their job to assess and determine whether the application for refugee family reunion should be 
approved or refused. Where refused, the decision is reviewed by an Entry Clearance Manager (ECM) and, where 
unsuccessful, the ECO or Visa Application Centre staff will issue the “reasons for refusal” letter to the refugee’s 
applicant family members. Significantly, the process can be opaque25 and it is not uncommon for little feedback 
to be provided to the applicant where they have been unsuccessful in the application.26 If an application is refused, 
the sponsor/applicant is not provided with an opportunity to submit further evidence to either strengthen their 
claim, or to refute the reason for the refusal at first instance. The refusal leads to re-applications, appeals and/or 
applications for Exceptional Case funding to support the further expense of appeals. This has a financial and time 
cost for the sponsor, a court case hearing the appeal is funded by the taxpayer and the applicant may continue to 
reside in danger until these processes are exhausted. 
 
Given the paper is interested in the use of a TJ approach to negate the worst effects of the current system of refugee 
family reunion and to assess the contribution of the Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill in this battle, two examples 
of problems in the system are raised. The first is the UK’s instance on applying refugee family reunion through 
the immigration, not asylum system. The second is the concept of the family and how the UK’s narrow approach 
adversely and unfairly affects refugees. 
 
3.1 Immigration or Asylum? 
 
The system of asylum in the UK is complex and heavily controlled by the State. The UK requires evidence to be 
presented which supports their claim and this is often difficult to establish and can lead to a large number of failed 
applications. Indeed, as of June 2019, the latest figures from the UK show that only 44% of initial decisions 
resulted in a grant of asylum or some other form of protection. This is exacerbated by the decision-making of the 
Home Office where many arbitrary decisions are made due to its consideration of the evidence available to be 
presented by the asylum seeker. This in turn leads to a legal challenge and the problems encountered there in terms 
of available advice and representation, the quality of that advice and representation and the emotional effects 
imposed on the individual forced to traverse this route to gain status. The Refugee Council of the UK also note 
that this system is even worse for female applicants who have difficulties, especially around the violence they 
have experienced which forms part of their application for asylum.27 
 
A symptom of the refugee crisis, with individuals entering the UK having been separated from their families, is 
the necessity for interaction with, and the ability to successfully traverse, national and international28 rules and 
guidance to facilitate the reunion. A legal right to refugee family reunion derives from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention29 and is provided to recognised refugees who have been granted refugee status or, since October 2006, 
five-years’ limited leave to remain under the Humanitarian Protection scheme. The right to family reunion is 
written into Part 8 and the FM section (Family Dependents) of the Immigration Rules. Significantly, refugee 
family reunion is a matter contained in the immigration rules rather than as an asylum issue where it would seem 
                                                 
25 For instance, there is relatively little information regarding published or consistent time scales for the 
application process and over complexity in the use of the online visa application system (the TLS (a 
teleperformance company) contact website) and ancillary online registration services. 
26 The use of DNA evidence is such an example. On the basis that the refugee cannot prove to the ECO’s 
satisfaction that he is the father of the applicant, DNA evidence is required. However, detailed instruction as to 
when, where and how the test will take place, and who should pay the fee are not provided to the refugee. Without 
support from an experienced advisor it may be difficult for the refugee to know where to gather this evidence. See 
Beswick (2015); and Connell, et al (2010), where the costs of acquiring DNA evidence, along with the costs of 
submitting appeals hearings in court (not to mention the emotional cost to family) are considered. 
27 https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/information/refugee-asylum-facts/the-truth-about-asylum/ (accessed 25 
August 2019). 
28 Such as the UNHCR, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Convention 
which, to further add to already existing complexity, do not dovetail neatly. 
29 See R (Gudanaviciene and Others) v Director of Legal Aid Casework; the Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 1840 
(Admin). 
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a more natural fit.30 Currently, refugee family reunion finds itself between “regular” permitted immigration, a 
system of managed migration, and asylum, where individuals are forced to flee and often enter the UK 
clandestinely (including, perhaps, being trafficked or smuggled into the country) and face the vagaries of the 
complex, dynamic, underfunded and often degrading asylum system. The individual granted with status is also, 
since 2005, generally to be issued with permission to reside in the UK for a period of five years. Their member of 
family who join them in the UK through the refugee family reunion system are issued with the same (remaining) 
period of time of residence. Hence an individual granted five years’ right to reside in the UK and who is reunited 
with their family after one year has only four years’ guaranteed right of residence. This period of time is applied 
to their family members too. Such a system impacts negatively on future decision-making about education, work 
and the rest of their lives. 
 
3.2 ‘Family’, What is a Family? 
 
Refugees in the UK are being left desperate and, in some instances, suicidal as a result of the immigration laws 
which prevent their reunification with their close family members. The Home Office’s policies, along with the 
Immigration Act produce an uncertain and opaque application system, which, whilst allowing ‘family’ to include 
pre-existing nuclear family members, restricts children over the age of 18 to be joined with the refugee sponsor 
(unless an application ‘outside of the rules’31 is made). A report by the Refugee Council and Oxfam also identified 
that three-quarters of refugees in the UK have separated family members who are ineligible for refugee family 
reunion due to the Immigration Rules.32 In previous papers, we have identified the practical consequences for 
refugees with the application process and the problems encountered with post-arrival integration.33 
 
There is no definition of the “family in international law and indeed, one of the reasons offered for discretion in 
this area is that a state party does not have exclusive jurisdiction in defining a family, because the definition has 
to be ‘without discrimination’” (van Bueren (1995) pp. 734–735). However, when one is offered, such as the 
definition provided in the Immigration Rules, in the UK context this is needlessly restrictive. The Rules permit 
an adult refugee in the UK to apply to be reunited with their spouse/partner and dependent children under the age 
of 18. These are the refugee’s “family.” A problem exists, which is certainly not an uncommon scenario, where 
the refugee’s wife and minor children are eligible to be reunited with the sponsor in the UK, yet children over the 
age of 18 are not. A choice is then made as to whether the rest of the family reunite in the UK leaving the elder 
child(ren) in the home country or, as frequently happens, the family are separated (or the older child attempts to 
make their own way into the UK with the consequent risks involved). Of course a mechanism exists within 
Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules for family members, including a child, over the age of 18, of the refugee 
to be reunited in the UK but this route is more onerous than the standard refugee family reunion and it is subject 
to an application fee.34 These “exceptional circumstances” cases are decided on a case by case basis, and hence 
are atypical and do not, even with the benefit of judicial intervention, affect the source legislation of family 
                                                 
30 This is, however, a politically contentious perspective as there are positive and negative implications to such a 
proposition. For instance, if it only sat in asylum there is an argument that the family members should also be 
tested under the Geneva Convention principles and could be detained etc. 
31 For instance, applications may be made on the basis of need relating to the family member’s age, Illness or a 
disability which requires personal care that may only be provided by the refugee relative in the UK. 
32 Refugee Council and Oxfam (2018) https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/safe-but-not-settled-the-
impact-of-family-separation-on-refugees-in-the-uk-620409 (accessed 1 July 2019). 
33 Marson and Ferris (2018). The authors discuss the issues surrounding refugees and their families’ integration 
into their new ‘UK’ life. Interestingly, the interpretation presented in the paper differs significantly on what post-
arrival support and integration means compared with that of the Home Secretary Sajid Javid’s idea that integration 
means replacing the existing ‘Life in the UK’ test for new citizens with a ‘British Values’ test and a strengthened 
English language requirement (speech delivered to the Conservative Party Conference, 2 October 2018). 
Available: https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/10/full-text-sajid-javids-conservative-conference-speech/ (accessed 
1 July 2019). 
34 In MM (Lebanon) & Ors [2017] UKSC 10 the Supreme Court assessed whether the “minimum income 
requirement” of partners and children of the sponsor applying for entry clearance to the UK was lawful. The 
requirement of the sponsor having an annual income of at least £18,600, with an additional £3,800 for the first 
child and £2,400 for each additional child had, in some instance, a disproportionately negative effect. Sponsors 
from certain ethnic groups (para. 81) tended to earn less, and regional variations in income were common 
(although ultimately it found the principle of minimum income to be lawful – para. 87). However, at paras. 92 
and 109, the Court found the requirement’s negative impact on the duty to promote the welfare of children to be 
“wrong in law” and thereby unlawful. 
 8 
reunion. It is also worth noting that the numbers of visas granted outside of the Rules has decreased in recent 
years.35 
 
Further, the current rules prevent child refugees to “sponsor” parents, grandparents and siblings to join them in 
the UK. In 2016, Lord Bates, on behalf of the government, commented that it would be inappropriate for children 
to sponsor their parents to join them in the UK as it “could result in children being encouraged, or even forced, to 
leave existing family units in their country and risk hazardous journeys to the UK in order to act as sponsors.”36 
Such scapegoating of individuals or groups in this way is exactly why TJ, as a philosophy, could achieve so much 
in the realm of refugee family reunion. As remarked by Diesen “… the justice system is too concerned with… 
confirming the validity of statutory provisions instead of trying to resolve the pertinent problems arising in 
connection with the matter at issue.”37 
 
It was, however, in November 2017 where the government rejected calls presented in a report by MPs on the 
Home Affairs Select Committee for lone child refugees to be permitted to be reunited with their parents. The 
Committee had called for the mirroring of rights provided to adults for children to be able to live safely with their 
family via family reunionification, and that to deny these to children was “perverse.” It is worth noting at this 
point that the UK is one of very few countries who deny family reunion to unaccompanied child refugees. The 
UNCRC38 provides, subject to limited exceptions, that “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will”39 and further that these applications will be dealt with by the 
State “in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.”40 This obligation relates not to the expeditious 
administration of applications but speaks more to State’s not breaching the provision by forcibly separating a child 
from their parents. The UNCRC has not been implemented directly into national law and the enforcement of an 
international convention is problematic at best.41 Without the government will to take up these rights and transpose 
them into national law, they present a standard to be achieved without the powers to compel any action at 
legislative or judicial levels. Certainly at present, extrinsic sources of international law may not be used to displace 
the object and purpose of legislation, whilst they can and have been used to limit the State’s obligations under, 
for example, the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Whether Convention rights 
can act as an appropriate interpretive aid to inform future legislative initiatives such as the Refugees (Family 
Reunion) Bill remains to be seen. However, given the current political climate and the lack of positive instruction 
in this area, international treaties have often been used to reduce rather than strengthen the protection afforded to 
groups including refugees. To this point, the system of refugee family reunion may be better served through a 
strict textual interpretation rather than relying on a teleological or purposive method. 
 
The refugee family reunion rules also apply to refugees living in the UK and do not allow a person identified as 
a refugee but residing abroad to be reunited with family members in the UK, if those family members in the UK 
either are not refugees or lack humanitarian protection status. Hence, a British citizen, married to an Eritrean 
national who has been recognised by the UNHCR as a refugee, living in Turkey would not be able to bring their 
spouse to the UK through the refugee family reunion rules. The course available to them is via the spousal visa 
route and this is subject to the (restrictive and often, in relation to refugees, unobtainable) applicable income 
thresholds.42  
 
Examples do exist of the judiciary providing a favourable ruling in relation to the Immigration Rules, but this 
does not defeat the underlying problems of the legislation and is frequently an exception rather than the rule. For 
instance, in HA & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department43 a stateless Bidoon 
                                                 
35 In 2001, 77 visas were granted outside of the rules, in 2014, this figure had fallen to 12 (see House of Lords 
Written Question 3957, 2 December 2015). 
36 Communication, Lord Bates to Lord Rosser, 8 January 2016, quoted at: https://helprefugees.org/news/child-
refugees-sponsor-families/ (accessed 1 July 2019). 
37 Diesen (1999-2012) p. 156. Available: www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/51-6.pdf (accessed 1 July 2019). 
38 The United Nations General Assembly Res. 44/25, 20 Nov. 1989; entered into force 20 Sept. 1990. Art. 10, 
UNCRC. 
39 Article 9(1). 
40 Article 10(1). 
41 The UNCRC contains no powers to penalise countries that breach its provisions. It cannot compel action on the 
part of the signatory State, even through the optional individual complaints mechanism. 
42 See the Refugee Council briefing on Refugee Family Union, Immigration Bill, Committee Stage in the House 
of Lords, February 2015. 
43 HA & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dublin III; Articles 9 and 
17.2) [2018] UKUT 297 (IAC). 
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from Kuwait was granted humanitarian protection and became a British citizen in 2013. He then applied to be 
joined by his wife and child but, as now a British citizen and not a refugee, was no longer subject to the 
“preferable” rules but rather the normal immigration rules with the application of the minimum earnings threshold. 
A refusal was issued but the wife and child managed to escape to Greece where, under the Dublin III Regulation, 
the Greek authorities suggested to the UK that the wife and child should move there given the existing family 
member (under the “family unity” provision). The UK refused arguing that as the husband was no longer a refugee 
Dublin III did not apply. The crux of the case came to the interpretation of the law. Did the law apply restrictively 
to individuals currently benefiting from international protection or was it extended to an more encompassing 
current and former beneficiary (Art. 17(2))? Unusually in this case, the tribunal determined the case on the latter 
and the family were reunited. 
 
Importantly, from the headline of the judgment it appears that a wide discretion of action is available to the 
Secretary of State and despite the potential for inconsistency in the Immigration Rules and Art. 9 and Art. 17(2) 
Dublin III, no action is required from the State to change those Rules or their interpretation: 
 
3) The decision impugned in this case was one arising from the exercise of a discretion conferred on the 
respondent. On that basis, and following Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,44 a court 
should not compel any authority to do more than consider the exercise of a power which is merely permissive 
and does not impose an obligation to act. 
 
4. “The Adoption of a Therapuetic Jurisprudence Philosophy”? 
 
To begin it is important that we establish what we understand by the term TJ. TJ is a complex philosophical 
approach45 which has been established as intentionally broad, lacking a restrictive definition, so as to incorporate 
different dimensions and not to be overly prescriptive or restrictive.46 Its comprehensibility leads to a level of 
uncertainty, but it is in this uninhibitedness where it may be applied most constructively. Such flexibility enables 
it to be applied and incorporated into a range of legal and non-legal fields. However, it is possible to identify TJ 
as a form of legal philosophy which attempts to discuss and highlight areas of importance which are often 
overlooked in traditional legal processes. In this regard, the law is looked at in relation to its human, emotional 
and psychological sides which, as many areas of law will impact, can have both therapeutic and anti-therapeutic 
effects (Winick and Wexler (2003); and Wexler (2011a), p. 34). Therefore, as a philosophy, TJ aims to develop 
approaches which maximise the positive psychological and emotional effects of the law and, using the behavioural 
sciences as an underpinning, seeks to develop therapeutic outcomes for all stakeholders (See Wexler, 2013). It 
enables the law to act as a “therapeutic agent” (Winick, 1996) by requiring members of the legal profession to 
incorporate theory and empiricism to inform and thereby improve the administration of justice. Importantly at this 
stage is to recognise that TJ does not exist purely as a theoretical approach but instead has moved from theory to 
practice (Wexler, 2011a) and, internationally, has been endorsed within rulings which conduct the administration 
of legal enterprises (Hora, Schma, and Rosenthal, 1999; and Perlin, 2018). 
 
TJ has a very well developed history and strong practical application (Wexler, 2014b) in areas where individuals 
within the legal system face a strong emotional component. For example, mental health law and drug courts (Hora, 
2002; Hora, Schma, and Rosenthal, 1999; KPMG, 2014; and Wexler and Winick, 1996) have for many years been 
subject to scrutiny and the application of TJ principles to assist all members of the legal system to better 
understand the emotional needs and psychological effects of the law in practice.47 Adopting such a philosophy 
has encouraged the participants to react creatively and to reimagine how behavioural science literature can infuse 
therapeutic law into these interactions (Wexler, 1999). The drug courts in the US have empowered the courts to 
determine treatment plans, establish rules by which the defendant must comply, explain the decision-making 
process, work collaboratively with all members of the court to determine mutually beneficial approaches and the 
results (among others) have been more engaged defendants at review hearings and a reduced recidivism rate. 
 
As has already been identified, TJ is concerned with how judiciaries apply procedures and the law which respect 
the interests of the individual and maintain their dignity (Winick and Wexler, 2003). How this is achieved, and 
                                                 
44 Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997. 
45 Complex in the sense that it holds both a law reform agenda, whilst also aiming to assign therapeutic goals to 
current legal systems within the limits of due process and justice. See Patry (1998). Available: 
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss2/12 (accessed 1 July 2019). 
46 As it remains a developing comprehensive law approach. 
47 Referred to in some texts as “emotional lawyering” with a deliberate moving away from the traditional lawyerly 
adversarial approach to conflict; Douglas (2015); and Silver (1999). 
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due to the breadth of TJ as a discipline, has resulted in some interactional principles being identified. These include 
acceptance, empathy, empowerment, hope and expectancy, a future focus, self-expression, warmth and respect 
(Winick and Wexler, 2003; and Petrucci, 2002). Some of these features have also been identified in Goldberg’s 
(2011) judicial training manual, which identifies key techniques as: empathy, respect, active listening, a positive 
focus, non-coercion, non-paternalism, and clarity. Importantly, research by Tyler & Bies (1990) concluded that 
the decisions reached by judges were considered insignificant when compared with perceived levels of fair 
treatment during the case. The legitimacy of explanations, the identification and explanation of procedural rules 
and outcomes led to TJ compliant results. However, this does often rely on the judge acting in a way which can 
facilitate a therapeutic outcome. What Perlin (2012) refers to as the charisma of the judge is particularly important 
in the running of a case and its outcome, and this refer specifically to the ‘wine’ component of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. The misapplication of procedural rules, and its anti-TJ effects, was recently demonstrated by the 
Home Secretary in R (Help Refugees) v Secretary of State for the Home Department48 and R (Citizens UK) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.49 Here the government’s implementation of Immigration Act 2016 
s. 67 (referred to as the “Dubs amendment”)50 was found to be in breach of the common law duty of procedural 
fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons to affected unaccompanied asylum seeking children who were 
rejected for transfer to the UK through s. 67. 
 
TJ as a philosophy was established by Bruce Winick and David Wexler. Wexler famously established a metaphor 
to help explain how TJ, as an examination tool for the potential or efficiency of a legal setting, could be utilised. 
The bottle and the wine are both essential characteristics of the legal setting (Wexler, 2014b) with the bottle 
referring to the legal structure, procedure and mechanisms under which the law would operate. The wine aspect 
of the analogy refers to the actual application of these rules within the settings as established (Lens, Katz, and 
Suarez, 2016). It also considers the application of the law on a micro level – such as the style used by the judge 
(Goldberg, 2011). The wine analogy is most discussed in the literature due to its more malleable essence and that 
it may be applied easier than can the bottle be changed. What is required to ensure a TJ rich environment is 
established are highly trained, skilled and knowledgeable members of the legal system, and a willingness for 
advisers, advocates and judges to be receptive to applying the TJ friendly wine (Wexler, 2013). 
 
The bottle, often referred to as the legal landscape, was structured around laws, provisions, rules, procedures and 
the rule of law that govern the legal setting. By its very nature, this bottle was difficult to change (Wexler, 2014b), 
develop or to be manipulated. It is relatively easy to see how such a metaphor could be used successfully in areas 
such as criminal proceedings and especially drug courts (Wexler, 2014a). These are where the TJ principles were 
initially founded. It is also appropriate to view the bottle in relation to the current laws regarding refugees and 
family reunion issues. There are strict rules and procedures by which all the actors in the legal system are obliged 
to follow and these are difficult to change, even by a well-meaning and emotionally attentive judge. 
 
The bottle and the wine are essential elements for the most enriching application of TJ. Where this is not possible 
due to, for example, an unfriendly bottle, it remains possible for TJ friendly wine to still be “poured.” This will 
undoubtedly undermine elements of its effectiveness, but skilled practitioners with the correct TJ “know-how” 
may still be placed and have an opportunity to ensure a positive therapeutic impact from the setting. An unfriendly 
bottle may be established through elements such as the constraints of legislation, the rule of law, and procedural 
norms which impose behaviours on the legal actors. In many instances this is how the current system of refugee 
family reunion operates, although of course legislative changes are on the horizon and judges skilled in TJ 
techniques can at least mitigate against the worst effects of the “current” bottle. 
 
The power of TJ is that it does not seek to automatically displace other perspectives and values of the law or 
within a legal setting (Perlin, 2013). Indeed, as Winick and Wexler identify, “other values such as justice and due 
process can be fully respected” within its application (Wexler and Winick, 1996). Whilst it holds a modified law 
reform agenda and is committed to promoting the therapeutic legal reform of systems, such reform must sit within 
the practical limits of due process and justice, and it consequently draws attention to the subtler consequences of 
legal processes (Perlin, 2013; Wexler and Winick, 1996; and Gal and Wexler, 2015). The use of TJ does not also 
mean that norms will not at times clash. The individual refugee wants to be joined in their new life with their 
family, yet the immigration system, including refugee family reunion, is concerned at a public level with 
                                                 
48 R (Help Refugees) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2098. 
49 R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812. Further, in this case 
the Home Secretary was found to have misled the court in giving evidence. 
50 The scheme, named after Lord Dubs who introduced it, whereby unaccompanied children in the refugee camp 
in Calais would be able to live in the UK despite having no family link. 
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immigration rates and its control. The legal system may be the place where, when used therapeutically, the causes 
and possible solutions to such normative disputes may be discovered and resolved. 
 
The refugee family reunion system in the UK (as a “bottle”), whilst not fulfilling the caricature of an adversarial 
system completely, cannot be said to have altered the existing legal order and adopted the lens of TJ through a 
rejection of adversarialism. The Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill, however, whilst not changing the fundamental 
application (or the “wine” element of Wexler’s analogy) does address and build upon some of the positive 
structural components inherent in the system. This, primarily, surrounds changes to the current practice of 
facilitating children to be reunited with their families and the concept of the family to be broadened to include 
older children and the applicant’s ascendants. Both of these groups are currently excluded, in the strict application 
and interpretation possible of the current law, from the refugee family reunion system.  
 
International conflicts and the circumstances that can lead to an individual becoming a refugee, the immigration 
system and the concerns surrounding the processing of these individuals, and the refugees’ applications for family 
reunion each lend themselves to a need to address the resultant “psycho-legal soft spots”51 present. TJ has 
expanded preventive law ideas. Where preventive law is concerned with anticipating legal soft spots, TJ is 
concerned with anticipating psycho-legal soft spots. This is in terms of “the psychological baggage that often 
accompanies legal moves and measures” (Wexler (2011b), at p. 34) or those areas where “… legal intervention 
or procedures… may lead to anxiety, distress, depression, hard and hurt feelings, etc.”52 This means considering 
the psychological/emotional risk that legal actions might pose and which has led to ideas around legal counselling 
being developed (Patry, 1998). The nature of the refugee’s experience of reaching the UK, their continued 
separation from their family, along with an application process of uncertain length and outcome, can produce the 
very negative emotional reactions or psycho-legal soft spots which can cause problems in the relationship between 
the refugee and the legal system and its actors. This, as evidenced by Wexler and Winick (2006), can produce a 
psychological resistance and other defence mechanisms that prevent the refugee from effectively articulating their 
story, their needs and their interests. These are crucial in refugee family reunion applications.  
 
Having identified the underlying principles of TJ and Wexler’s “wine and bottle” metaphor, we now continue 
through the use of several examples to demonstrate how the legal and administrative system in the UK produces 
anti-therapeutic effects. This is the inflexible “bottle” element of the metaphor discussed in section 5. In section 
6, we continue by explaining how a TJ approach can be the therapeutic “wine” which mitigates against the worst 
effects of the law.  
 
5. A Broken Bottle? The Anti-Therapeutic Effects of the Law 
 
There are, perhaps, too many examples of problems inherent in the immigration and asylum system as they apply 
to refugees to be explored in one article. To illustrate just two contemporary issues, the following are used. The 
first is a problem experienced by detainees in the asylum system, and the second with the concerns over the 
removal of legal aid and the restrictive interpretation of the “family.” 
 
The Immigration Act 2016 also established changes to the system of immigration bail (with a commencement 
date of January 2018). The 2016 Act repealed the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s. 4(1)(c) which enabled 
homeless migrants to apply for government accommodation from within a detention centre where they had no 
other residence established upon release. The charity Bail for Immigration Detainees found, through a Freedom 
of Information request, the negative effects that this scheme had caused. In the first five months of 2018 in only 
24 cases was accommodation offered compared with 2,800 offers of accommodation in the previous year. The 
charity also identifies a series of scenarios which, whilst purporting to provide other forms of assistance and 
redress to homeless migrants seeking accommodation, actually merely compound an already broken system. For 
instance, migrants who are not asylum seekers can request accommodation through the Immigration Act 2016, 
para. 9, Sch 10. However, this part of the Act has no mechanism for such an application to be made. Failed asylum 
seekers may apply for accommodation through the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s. 4(2) where they have 
proof that they are due to be released within 14 days of the application. Detainees are not provided with a date for 
their release. Finally, other asylum seekers may apply for accommodation through the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999, s. 95 where they are “destitute.” Detainees, according to the Home Office, are by their nature not 
destitute and thus the asylum seeker is ostensibly forced to leave detention, live on the street where they will be 
destitute before being able to satisfy the requirements of s. 95 and apply for accommodation. Also, judges at the 
                                                 
51 Which may lead to “strongly negative emotional reactions that diminish the client’s psychological wellbeing.” 
Winick (2000), at p. 108.  
52 Patry (1998). Available: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss2/12 (accessed 1 July 2019). 
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First-Tier Tribunal will be unlikely to release a person who does not have accommodation arranged. Consequently 
such individuals remain in detention due to their lack of accommodation. A most unfair and vicious circle in 
which to be caught.  
 
The significance of the removal of legal aid in England and Wales to refugees seeking reunion with their family 
members cannot be underestimated. This has led to a reduction in the law firms offering refugee family reunion 
services (through firms closing and practitioners leaving the profession),53 and those who do provide such an 
unregulated service may charge fees which make accessing the service impractical. Refugees who wish to appeal 
against a refusal to award legal aid may complete an Exceptional Case Funding application, but these are very 
complex forms and often require the legal assistance denied to the refugee in the first instance.  
 
Given the problems encountered in the aftermath of the introduction of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act 2012 Angus MacNeil MP, supported by a number of refugee rights’ groups including Amnesty 
International and the UNHCR, introduced a private members’ Bill titled the “Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill.” 
The Bill addresses two issues which currently place England and Wales out of step with not only other European 
countries but, in the case of legal aid, with Scotland too. Taking the legal aid issue first, the Bill intends for the 
reintroduction of legal aid to help refugees with the navigation through the complicated application process. 
 
Secondly, unlike most other countries and their dealings with refugee family reunion applications, in the UK adult 
applicants are entitled to apply to be reunited with their spouse and descendants (under the age of 18). To 
successfully apply for adult children, parents and grandparents requires a different claim on the basis of 
exceptional medical or humanitarian grounds. Success on applications by children for reunification with their 
family (here a mother and the applicant’s brother) had been achieved via the application of Article 8 of the ECHR 
in AT and another.54 The Upper Tribunal held that statutory instructions55 to the UK Border Agency on making 
arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, issued under the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009 s. 55 were paramount. Indeed, Judge McCloskey remarked that the provisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the EU Reception 
Conditions Directive56 and UNCRC had to be fulfilled when the UK Border Agency exercises its functions. 
Consequently, the Secretary of State and the bodies which act with the authority of the government, including UK 
Border Agency, UK Visas and Immigration and the ECO and ECMs were required to give effect to international 
treaties when making decisions affecting children. Of course, whilst successful appeals in the Upper Tribunal and 
instructions for the judiciary to utilise statutory interpretation to give indirect effect to the international provisions 
are to be welcomed, they do not create new statutory rights. An individual case may find incompatibilities with 
ECHR rights rather than the relevant general rules or policies. Thus continues the debate between literal and 
purposive methods of interpretation, its narrow or broad application, (Sneath, 1985) not to mention the uncertainty 
this maintains (Walshaw, 2014). 
 
The Bill would expand the definition of who qualifies as a family member and thus allow child refugees to sponsor 
their close family members (such as their parents) to join them in their new life in the UK. This is important for 
the child refugee when beginning to rebuild their life in a new country, with the myriad issues which such upheaval 
brings. It also aims to help further protect such vulnerable people. “At the moment, the UK Government’s 
regressive and strict immigration laws have punished child refugees by cutting them off from their families, which 
leaves them vulnerable and risks young people being exploited or possibly trafficked without that family support 
around them.”57  
 
6. Restorative Wine: Infusing a Therapeutic Paradigm in Decision-Making 
                                                 
53 Legal Action “Review of Evidence to LASPO Act Impact Inquiry” (2014) June, p. 9. 
54 AT and another [2016] UKUT 227 (IAC). 
55 Home Office/Department for Children and Families, “Every Child Matters”, November 2009. 
56 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers (replaced by Directive 2013/33/EU). The new Directive, agreed on 14 June 2018 further adds protection 
for refugee family reunion: “The definition of family members… will include dependent adult children and 
families formed before arrival in the EU, and not just those coming from the country of origin... As regards to 
siblings, member states may choose to include them in the definition.” Available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180614IPR05803/reception-conditions-for-asylum-
seekers-agreed-between-meps-and-council (accessed 1 July 2019). 
57 Settle (2018) The Sunday Herald 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/16090953.SNP_MP_makes_parliamentary_bid_to_end__quot_grievous_i
njustice_quot__for_Syrian_refugees/ quoting Angus MacNeil (accessed 1 July 2019). 
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This paper is most concerned with the development of legislative initiative to remedy the problems encountered 
by refugees in the UK attempting to be reunited with their families. There is also a need, either in the absence of 
legislation or administrative instruction, or in conjunction with these moves to consider the wine dimension of the 
law and how this can elevate new laws through their application or ameliorate the worst effects of the current 
systems. First, a willingness is required of legislators to consider the therapeutic wellbeing of those exposed to 
the law. Be this to motivate rehabilitation and instil mechanisms that help build strengths around pro-social 
behaviours in criminal law, or those that encourage and facilitate reintegration and settled status in relation to 
refugee family reunion. Legislation and the way the laws are interpreted has a profound effect on the people 
involved and none more so than the refugees seeking to be reunited with their families. It is widely accepted that 
refugees have typically sustained levels of psychological distress on their journey to the UK, and this continues 
following their arrival in safety (Stolle and Wexler, 1997; and Stolle, Wexler and Winick (Eds.), 2000). Male 
refugees are known to suffer survivor guilt58 having left their families behind in an unsafe situation, they are 
frequently distressed at the administrative and sometimes legal processes ahead of them to be reunited, and their 
sense of helplessness and confusion as to the Byzantine asylum system facing them is palpable. Thus, the non-
legal aspects or consequences (Patry, 1998) that the law may have and the broader context of the individual’s 
interaction with legal processes (Wexler, 2005; 2008; and 2011b) may aid in a movement away from the typical 
adversarial paradigm / culture of conflict that has historically dominated the legal landscape in the UK (Karlberg, 
2004).  
 
Increasingly, a movement has been gathering pace for legal scholars and practitioners to stop seeing the law as a 
means of categorising and resolving legal problems but to consider its effects (Cruz, 2009). This is where the 
psycho-legal consequences of the law may prevail. For example, family law and immigration law, supporting as 
they do children and refugees and whose work may therefore evoke strong emotional reactions (such as refugee 
family reunion) seem especially apt. Thus, the concept of emotion in the legal system is not something to be 
avoided (Maroney, 2006), rather the traditional paradigm of training lawyers59 to detach themselves emotionally 
from their clients negates the relationship between the two (Gerdy (2008) at p. 18). 
 
The current and proposed system of refugee family reunion often fails to use international sources of law and 
instructive comments to inform decision-making. The application process, as already noted, is based on a generic 
series of questions which are often not relevant in the sponsor’s circumstances and establishes obfuscation rather 
than clarity. As way of an example, refugee family reunion does not require satisfaction of the “adequate 
maintenance and accommodation” test for persons seeking to reside in the UK. But, as there is no bespoke form 
or indeed system for refugee family reunion, sponsors are forced to comply with completing the appendix forms 
which asks for this information. It is possible that this aspect of the form is not tested and if it were it would likely 
be subject to a judicial review. However, at the time of writing this has not occurred. It is worth reiterating at this 
stage that the submission of the application form by the sponsor is considered by an ECO and a negative decision 
is then confirmed by an ECM before the sponsor’s family are informed. This is performed through a paper-based 
exercise with no ability or availability for the sponsor to speak directly with the ECO, to answer questions, or to 
provide supplementary and supporting evidence before a decision is made. The letter sent to the sponsor’s family 
is reminiscent of a template document and uses accusatory language relating to the credibility of the evidence and 
can even extend to that of the existence of any relationship between the sponsor and their family. This power 
imbalance, the lack of transparency, and the efficacy of attempting to address the defects of the first application 
(where such indication is communicated) all establish a result of a process which is anti-therapeutic. A negative 
result regarding a sponsor’s application for family reunion will always be disappointing, but here the process itself 
compounds the negativity and causes despair in the sponsor as to how they may put right the reasons for the 
refusal. 
 
When a sponsor proceeds to appeal a negative decision in the courts, they likely find that the court is (perhaps 
naturally) more concerned with the resolution of the conflict between the sponsor’s application and the Home 
Office, rather than considering the reasoning behind the case arriving in the court. There are many elements of 
the application process which are notoriously problematic and known by practitioners, but not necessarily 
addressed by the courts. First is the complexity of the application form with the duplication of information 
required, particularly for individuals who may not be able to confidently communicate in English (Beswick, 
2015). There is a requirement for irrelevant details of matters, such as the sponsor’s housing and their future needs 
                                                 
58 Specifically, in relation to adolescents see Herman (1992); and Stotz, Elbert, Müeller, and Schauer (2015). 
59 Historically, this was seen on an international basis, see Menkel-Meadow (1994). But, it is becoming more 
prominent in UK lawyer training: see Dagilyte and Coe (2014). 
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when (if eventually successful) their family joins them.60 The details of the reasons for a refusal often will not 
specifically address defects  in the application which are readily addressable by the sponsor. And, concerns 
continue to be raised relating to the need for documentary evidence to be submitted to establish the on-going 
relationship between the sponsor and their family (which may no longer exist - Gower and McGuiness, 2016). It 
is in the failure to address these systemic and underlying problems, and an unwillingness or inability to consider 
long-term solutions to these, that perpetuates the difficulties. The treatment of the sponsor when exposed to legal 
and non-legal issues, and the psycho-legal effects which arise therefrom, are important factors in the experience 
of the sponsor. Further, as Diesen identifies, “This does not mean, however, that adjudication influenced by TJ 
ideals implies that the judge shall act as a welfare officer, and that the court shall abandon its traditional 
adjudicative functions, offering instead panoply of rehabilitative services and social measures.”61 Rather, TJ 
supplements the existing structures by exploring underlying factors that can positively raise issues which requires 
a judicial, and even legislative, response. It encourages discussion, collaborative working and respect which all 
direct the parties to reaching a settlement which complies with the law, and uses the law to help parties rather than 
being limited to simply adjudication or the administration of rules. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have attempted to provide an amalgamation of the bodies of literature and principles surrounding 
TJ, and to demonstrate their use in the application to forthcoming (and existing) legislative provisions regarding 
refugees. The values underpinning the comprehensive law movement are applicable to all involved in the 
administration of refugee family reunion law. To reiterate the points as presented in this paper, and which are 
demonstrated through the experience of practitioners and clients alike, existing laws, underpinned by humanitarian 
ideals, are frequently hampered by a system which is inflexible, often opaque, and does not allow for the nuances 
of an emerging and developing refugee crisis. Increasingly, unaccompanied children are finding their way to the 
UK as refugees and are unable, through the Immigration Rules on refugee family reunion, to sponsor applications 
from family members (such as their parents and siblings). The removal of legal aid for refugee family reunion 
cases has had a particularly negative effect on applicants. Decisions on such family reunion cases can take several 
months to be processed and a negative decision because of some procedural failing on behalf of the refugee’s 
application can be devastating and cause great hardship to them and their family members trapped abroad. The 
practical effects may be eased through the enactment of the Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill which addresses 
some key problems (although, of course, many others still exist). Whether the Bill proceeds to an Act of 
Parliament is questionable, as is the future direction to be taken by the UK government following the conclusion 
of the Brexit negotiations. However, regardless of the laws or policy in place, what we hoped to have demonstrated 
in this paper is how those working in the refugee family reunion sector can, through adopting a TJ philosophy, 
mitigate against the worst of the anti-therapeutic effects of the current law and ensure the TJ effects of the new 
Bill are maximised. 
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